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Federalism and the Disappearing Equal 
Protection Rights of Immigrants 
Kevin R. Johnson* 
Abstract 
Jenny-Brooke Condon’s article The Preempting of Equal 
Protection for Immigrants? analyzes important issues 
surrounding the constitutional rights of immigrants. Professor 
Condon in essence contends that the current legislative, executive, 
and scholarly focus on the distribution of immigration power 
between the state and federal governments has undermined the 
Equal Protection rights of legal immigrants in the United 
States. Despite the contentious national debates over immigration 
reform, immigrants’ rights have generally been of secondary 
concern in contemporary immigration scholarship, which is now 
dominated by analysis of immigration federalism.  
Professor Condon undoubtedly is correct that we should not 
lose sight of the rights of immigrants through a myopic focus on 
federalism concerns. Courts should be vigilant to protect 
noncitizens from the excesses of all governmental exercises of 
power, including discrimination against immigrants by the 
federal government.  
This essay identifies two areas for future inquiry that build on 
The Preempting of Equal Protection for Immigrants? First, 
Professor Condon questions the arbitrary line-drawing between 
the standards of review of state and federal alienage 
classifications. But, she herself draws a questionable line by 
advocating for greater protection of the constitutional rights of 
legal immigrants, while stopping short of calling for the extension 
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of rights to undocumented immigrants. However, all immigrants 
are disenfranchised, lack direct political power, and frequently 
suffer the disfavor of the majority in the political process. That 
status militates in favor of strict scrutiny review of laws targeting 
undocumented as well as lawful immigrants.    
Second, if Professor Condon’s call for greater attention to the 
Equal Protection rights of noncitizens is taken seriously, we must 
examine the continuing vitality of the plenary power 
doctrine. That exceptional doctrine shields from judicial review 
invidious classifications under the U.S. immigration laws, 
including discrimination that would be patently unconstitutional 
if applied to U.S. citizens; those laws historically have 
discriminated against noncitizens who are racial minorities, poor, 
disabled, women, political dissidents, and others. Dismantling 
what is known as “immigration exceptionalism” has long puzzled 
immigration law scholars. Professor Condon reminds us of the 
need to reconsider the constitutional immunity for immigrant 
admissions and removal criteria. 
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I. Introduction 
Jenny-Brooke Condon’s article The Preempting of Equal 
Protection for Immigrants?1 thoughtfully analyzes important 
issues surrounding the constitutional rights of immigrants. 
Professor Condon contends that the current legislative, executive, 
and scholarly focus on the distribution of immigration power 
between the state and federal governments has undermined the 
Equal Protection rights of legal immigrants in the United States.2 
Despite the contentious national debates over immigration 
reform, immigrants’ rights have generally been of secondary 
concern in contemporary immigration scholarship, which today is 
dominated by analysis of immigration federalism.3   
In an era in which the Supreme Court has moved toward 
greater consistency in Equal Protection doctrine,4 Professor 
Condon examines a jarring incongruence in the Court’s alienage 
jurisprudence. The Court has required strict scrutiny review of 
                                                                                                     
 1.  Jenny-Brooke Condon, The Preempting of Equal Protection for 
Immigrants?,  73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 77 (2016). 
 2.  See id. at 160–63 (arguing that Equal Protection jurisprudence with 
respect to immigrants’ rights needs “realignment”).  
 3.  See, e.g., Kerry Abrams, Plenary Power Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV. 601 
(2013); Jennifer M. Chacón, The Transformation of Immigration Federalism, 21 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 577 (2012); Stella Burch Elias, The New Immigration 
Federalism, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 703 (2013); Clare Huntington, The Constitutional 
Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787 (2008); Cristina M. 
Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. 
L. REV. 567 (2008); Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and 
Local Power Over Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557 (2008). However, there are 
exceptions. See, e.g., Geoffrey Heeren, Persons Who Are Not the People: The 
Changing Rights of Immigrants in the United States, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 367 (2013) (contending that the rights of noncitizens often are lost in court 
decisions that focus on federalism and administrative law doctrines); Joseph 
Landau, Due Process and the Non-Citizen:  A Revolution Reconsidered, 47 CONN. 
L. REV. 879 (2015) (analyzing how modern due process doctrine has expanded 
the rights of immigrants). 
 4.  See, e.g., Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) 
(holding that strict scrutiny applies to all racial classifications, including those 
employed in programs designed to remedy past discrimination); see also Victor 
C. Romero, The Congruence Principle Applied:  Rethinking Equal Protection 
Review of Federal Alienage Classifications After Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Peña, 76 OR. L. REV. 425, 429 (1997) (contending that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Adarand militates in favor of meaningful judicial review of federal 
alienage classifications).   
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state-based discrimination against lawful immigrants.5 In stark 
contrast, the Court has exercised extremely deferential review of 
federal alienage classifications.6  
Although deviating from the review standard for state 
alienage classifications as well as conventional Equal Protection 
doctrine, deference to federal alienage classifications is consistent 
with a line of cases originating in the late eighteenth century. 
Those decisions established the extraordinary “plenary power” 
doctrine; the Supreme Court has proclaimed that, because 
Congress and the Executive Branch possess “plenary power” over 
immigration, federal immigration laws are effectively immune 
from ordinary judicial review of their constitutionality.7 In 
creating that doctrine, the Court upheld racial discrimination in a 
series of laws designed to exclude and deport Chinese immigrants 
from the United States. Despite the intervening constitutional 
revolution of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court has yet to 
overrule, or significantly limit, its plenary power decisions.8 
Professor Condon reviews several developments that have 
allowed the application of the deferential standard of review 
applicable to federal alienage classifications to shield state 
classifications from constitutional review. Her rights-focused 
approach forcefully responds to the thrust of much major 
immigration impact litigation and the trend of congressional and 
federal delegation of immigration authority to the states, as well 
                                                                                                     
 5.    See infra notes 18–25 and accompanying text (noting justifications for 
strict scrutiny of alienage classifications).  
 6.  See infra notes 26–37 and accompanying text (questioning the Supreme 
Court’s failure to subject federal alienage classifications to strict scrutiny). 
 7.  See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) 
(upholding a law targeting Chinese immigrants for deportation); Chae Chan 
Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889) 
(rejecting constitutional challenges to law requiring the exclusion of Chinese 
noncitizens from the United States). For capsule summaries of the plenary 
power doctrine, see Kevin R. Johnson, Minorities, Immigrant and Otherwise, 
118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 77 (Oct. 2008); Michael Kagan, Plenary Power is 
Dead! Long Live Plenary Power!, 114 MICH. L. REV FIRST IMPRESSIONS 21 (2015). 
 8.    See Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race 
Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 
5–6 (1998) (“[T]he plenary power doctrine is said to make racial discrimination 
in the immigration context lawful per se.”); Louis Henkin, The Constitution and 
United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 853 (1987) (criticizing the Supreme Court decisions upholding the 
discriminatory Chinese exclusion laws).   
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as the trajectory of contemporary immigration scholarship.9 
Professor Condon specifically contends that the reliance on 
federal preemption doctrine to displace state immigration 
enforcement laws has undermined the constitutional rights of 
immigrants.10 In consistently finding that federal power trumps 
state power over immigration, courts have effectively placed 
greater authority over the rights of immigrants in the hands of 
the federal government, which has few legal constraints on how it 
treats immigrants. Moreover, express congressional delegation of 
authority to the states to deny public benefits to immigrants in 
1996 welfare reform legislation,11 has removed discriminatory 
state laws from strict scrutiny review, with discrimination 
against lawful immigrants tolerated, and arguably encouraged, 
by a deferential review standard applicable to federal alienage 
classifications.12 The overall result is the dilution of the 
constitutional rights of immigrants. 
Professor Condon cautions us to not lose sight of the rights of 
immigrants through a myopic focus on federalism concerns. 
Courts should be vigilant to protect noncitizens from the excesses 
of all governmental exercises of power, including those of the 
federal government. 
This essay identifies two areas for future inquiry that build 
on The Preempting of Equal Protection for Immigrants? First, 
Professor Condon questions the arbitrary line-drawing between 
the standards of review of state and federal alienage 
classifications. But, she herself draws a questionable line by 
advocating greater protection of the constitutional rights of legal 
immigrants, while stopping short of calling for the extension of 
rights to undocumented immigrants. However, all immigrants, 
legal and unauthorized, are disenfranchised, lack direct political 
                                                                                                     
 9.   See infra Part III (arguing that the federal preemption doctrine at 
times has failed to adequately protect the rights of immigrants). 
 10.    See Condon, supra note 1, at 125–28 (summarizing cases in which the 
Supreme Court employed federal preemption doctrine in reviewing laws 
affecting immigrants).  
 11.    See infra note 51 and accompanying text (noting that the Executive 
Branch has aggressively enforced the criminal removal provisions of the 
immigration laws, only to have the Supreme Court reject a number of those 
efforts).  
 12.    See Condon, supra note 1, at 129–50 (making this point). 
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power, and frequently suffer the disfavor of the majority in the 
political process. That insularity favors strict scrutiny review of 
laws targeting undocumented as well as lawful immigrants.13   
Second, if Professor Condon’s call for greater attention to the 
Equal Protection rights of noncitizens is taken seriously, we must 
examine the continuing vitality of the much-criticized plenary 
power doctrine. That exceptional doctrine shields from 
meaningful judicial review invidious classifications under the 
U.S. immigration laws, including discrimination that would be 
patently unconstitutional if applied to U.S. citizens; those laws 
historically have discriminated against noncitizens who are racial 
minorities, poor, disabled, women, political dissidents, and 
others.14 Dismantling what is known as “immigration 
exceptionalism”15 long has perplexed immigration law scholars.16 
It deserves our utmost attention.  
II. An Unjustifiable Equal Protection Dichotomy? 
Professor Condon directs attention to a glaring dichotomy in 
the Supreme Court’s Equal Protection jurisprudence concerning 
the review of alienage classifications. It was not established by 
antiquated decisions. but instead is the product of two cases 
decided just a few years ago.17 
                                                                                                     
 13. See infra Part IV.A. (discussing the need to protect the rights of 
undocumented immigrants). 
 14.  See generally KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE “HUDDLED MASSES” MYTH:  
IMMIGRATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS (2004) (analyzing the history of discrimination 
against various minorities under the U.S. immigration laws and their 
enforcement); Michele Goodwin & Erwin Chemerinsky, No Immunity: Race, 
Class, and Civil Liberties in Times of Health Crisis: On Immunity: An 
Inoculation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 956, 965–76 (2016) (summarizing the racial and 
class impacts of health exclusions in the U.S. immigration laws). 
 15.  See generally Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human 
Rights, and Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361 (1999); 
Rachel E. Rosenbloom, The Citizenship Line: Rethinking Immigration 
Exceptionalism, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1965 (2013). 
 16.  For sources discussing the plenary power doctrine, see generally T. 
ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY (2002); GERALD L. 
NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION (1996). 
 17. See Gilbert Paul Carrasco, Congressional Arrogation of Power:  Alien 
Constellation in the Galaxy of Equal Protection, 74 B.U. L. REV. 591, 603–05 
(1994) (contending that congressional delegation to the states of the power to 
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In Graham v. Richardson,18 the Supreme Court in 1971 
addressed a challenge to state laws restricting the eligibility of 
certain lawful permanent residents for public benefit programs. It 
unanimously held that:  
[T]he Court’s decisions have established that classifications 
based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are 
inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.  
Aliens as a class are a prime example of a “discrete and 
insular” minority (see United States v. Carolene Products Co., 
304 U.S. 144, 152–53, n.4 (1938)) for whom such heightened 
judicial solicitude is appropriate.19    
Consistent with modern Equal Protection doctrine, the Court 
classified lawful immigrants as a “suspect class” and subjected 
state laws that discriminate against them to strict scrutiny; such 
laws can be upheld only if justified by a compelling governmental 
interest. In applying that exacting standard of judicial review, 
the Court not surprisingly invalidated state restrictions on 
benefit receipt by lawful permanent residents.20  
General Equal Protection jurisprudence favors strict scrutiny 
review of laws that discriminate against discrete and insular 
minorities, including immigrants.21 Lawfully disenfranchised, 
lawful permanent residents lack direct political power.22 Political 
                                                                                                     
deny benefits to immigrants is unconstitutional); Romero, supra note 4, at 430–
38 (examining the disjunction in Supreme Court decisions between judicial 
review of state and federal alienage classifications). 
 18.  403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
 19.    Id. at 371–72 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
 20.  See id. at 376. For skepticism about the Court’s adoption of strict 
scrutiny review in Graham v. Richardson, see Michael Scaperlanda, Partial 
Membership: Aliens and the Constitutional Community, 81 IOWA L. REV. 707, 
722–23 (1996). 
 21.  See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 161–62 (1980) (contending that immigrants constitute a 
discrete and insular minority and, consequently, that laws that discriminate 
against them should be subject to strict scrutiny); David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 
STAN. L. REV. 953, 981 (2002) (“When one adds to . . . the ignoble history of anti-
immigrant sentiment among the voting citizenry, usually laced with racial 
animus, aliens are a group particularly warranting judicial protection.”); Neal 
Katyal, Equality in the War on Terror, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1383–84 (2007) 
(“Executives that seek to harness the benefits of deference in court would . . . be 
well advised to avoid blatant discrimination on the basis of alienage.”). 
 22.  See Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, 
Constitutional, and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 
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disempowerment was the rationale offered by the Supreme Court 
in the famous Carolene Products footnote four for strict scrutiny 
review of laws disadvantaging “discrete and insular minorities.”  
Due to their political powerlessness and insularity in 
American society, immigrants historically have been the subject 
of the wrath of the political process in the United States, 
including a great many punitive laws.23 To make matters worse, a 
majority, although far from all, immigrants are people of color.24 
As a result, the immigration laws arguably have been employed 
at various times as a proxy for race and a means to discriminate 
against racial minorities.25 The specter of racial discrimination, 
accomplished through the reliance on alienage classifications, 
renders many immigrants as a discrete and insular minority in 
two distinct respects, thus strongly favoring strict scrutiny review 
of laws that discriminate against them. 
In 1976, the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Diaz26 
unanimously articulated the polar opposite of strict scrutiny 
                                                                                                     
1391, 1391–94 (1993) (questioning the near-universal disenfranchisement of 
lawful permanent residents); Gerald M. Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: 
Why Not the Right to Vote?, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1092, 1092 (1977) (to the same 
effect). Although immigrants indirectly exercise political power separate and 
apart from the ballot box, their inability to vote significantly constrains those 
efforts. See JOHN TIRMAN, DREAM CHASERS:  IMMIGRATION AND THE AMERICAN 
BACKLASH 91–109 (2015) (discussing the emergence of the undocumented college 
students known as DREAMers as a potent force in American politics); Daniel 
Kanstroom, “Alien” Litigation as Polity-Participation: The Positive Power of a 
“Voteless Class of Litigants”, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 399, 400, 439 (2012) 
(analyzing the use of litigation as a political tool by immigrant rights activists) 
 23. See generally JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF 
AMERICAN NATIVISM, 1860-1925 (4th ed. 2002) (documenting the events 
culminating in congressional passage of a restrictive national origins quotas 
system in 1924); JOHNSON, supra note 14 (analyzing the history of 
discrimination against various minority groups in the U.S. immigration laws). 
 24.  See Kevin R. Johnson, The End of “Civil Rights” as We Know It?: 
Immigration and the Civil Rights Law in the New Millennium, 49 UCLA L. REV. 
1481, 1491–1510 (2002) (explaining how immigration from Mexico has changed 
the racial composition of the U.S. population). 
 25.  See generally Kevin R. Johnson, A Case Study of Color-Blindness: The 
Racially Disparate Impacts of Arizona’s S.B. 1070 and the Failure of 
Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 2 UC IRVINE L. REV. 313 (2012) (analyzing 
the racially disparate impacts of the enforcement of state immigration 
enforcement laws as well as the potential positive impacts on Latina/o 
immigrants and their families of the passage of comprehensive immigration 
reform). 
 26.  426 U.S. 67 (1976). 
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review of discrimination in the review of an alienage 
classification in a federal health benefit program:  
In the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and 
immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be 
unacceptable if applied to citizens. The exclusion of aliens and 
the reservation of the power to deport have no permissible 
counterpart in the Federal Government’s power to regulate the 
conduct of its own citizenry. The fact that an Act of Congress 
treats aliens differently from citizens does not in itself imply 
that such disparate treatment is “invidious.”27 
In a footnote, the Court explained that  
[a]ny policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven 
with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of 
foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a 
republican form of government. Such matters are so exclusively 
entrusted to the political branches of government as to be 
largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.28 
In applying an extremely deferential review standard, the Court 
not surprisingly upheld a congressional restriction on the 
eligibility of lawful permanent residents for federal benefits.  
The toothless standard of review applied by the Supreme 
Court in Mathews v. Diaz to a federal alienage classification is a 
far cry from the strict scrutiny review of state alienage 
classifications adopted in Graham v. Richardson. However, the 
political process defect that results in suspect classification status 
and strict scrutiny review of state alienage classifications in 
Graham applies with equal force to alienage classifications in the 
federal laws. As the Court emphasized without qualification, 
“[a]liens as a class are a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular’ 
minority.”29 The inconsistency of the judicial review standards 
thus is difficult to justify as a matter of constitutional law.30    
The deferential approach of Mathews v. Diaz, along with the 
justification offered by the Supreme Court, unquestionably 
                                                                                                     
 27.  Id. at 79–80.  
 28.  Id. at 81 n.17 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 29.    Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. at 372.  
 30.  See Brian Soucek, The Return of Noncongruent Equal Protection, 83 
FORDHAM L. REV. 155, 173–86 (2014) (analyzing the Supreme Court’s 
inconsistent approaches to constitutional review of state and federal alienage 
classifications). 
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sounds of the plenary power doctrine, which has historically 
immunized from judicial review the judgments of Congress about 
which immigrants to admit into, as well as to deport from, the 
United States.31 However, Mathews v. Diaz applied the doctrine 
to the review of a federal law that discriminates against 
immigrants lawfully admitted to—and physically present in—the 
United States, not noncitizens seeking entry into, or facing 
removal from, the country.32   
To an immigration law professor, it is striking that Professor 
Condon discusses Mathews v. Diaz but does not analyze in any 
detail the fact that it is firmly rooted in the plenary power 
doctrine.33 Immigration professors regularly cite Mathews v. Diaz 
as the modern reaffirmation, if not problematic extension, of that 
extraordinary doctrine.34   
In Mathews v. Diaz, the Supreme Court need not have 
invoked the plenary power doctrine. It instead could have ruled 
that lawful permanent residents physically present in the United 
States deserve full Equal Protection rights, including strict 
scrutiny review of federal alienage classifications. That would 
have mirrored the review standard applicable to state alienage 
classifications under Graham v. Richardson,35 a congruence that 
would be generally consistent with the thrust of modern Equal 
Protection doctrine.36 In so doing, the Court need not have 
                                                                                                     
 31.  See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text (discussing the roots of the 
plenary power doctrine). 
 32.  See Soucek, supra note 30, at 199 (“The problem in Diaz is that the 
alienage-based Medicare restrictions at issue in that case were not, in any 
obvious way, part of immigration law at all.”). 
 33.  See Condon, supra note 1, at 100 n.96 (citing scholarship analyzing the 
influence of the plenary power doctrine on the Court’s holding in Mathews v. 
Diaz). 
 34. See, e.g., Allison Brownell Tirres, Mercy in Immigration Law, 2013 
BYU L. REV. 1563, 1599 (analyzing Mathews v. Diaz). 
 35.  Cf. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (holding that the Fifth 
Amendment prohibits racial segregation by the federal government, just as the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment bars racial 
discrimination by the states); Kenneth L. Karst, The Fifth Amendment’s 
Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 N.C. L. REV. 541, 542 (1977) (analyzing the 
Equal Protection guarantee applicable to the federal government).   
 36.  See supra note 4 and accompanying text (citing sources discussing the 
Court’s contemporary Equal Protection jurisprudence). Hiroshi Motomura 
sketches an Equal Protection model incorporating Graham v. Richardson and 
Mathews v. Diaz in Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and Alienage, Federalism 
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resolved the question of the appropriate constitutional review of 
the provisions governing the admission of noncitizens to, or 
deportation from, the United States.37  
III. The Failure of Federal Preemption Doctrine to Protect 
Immigrant Rights  
In challenges to a virtual plethora of recent state 
immigration enforcement laws fueled by public concern with 
undocumented immigration,38 litigants have relied primarily on 
the Supremacy Clause39 and federal preemption doctrine, not the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Even if 
the true hope was to protect the rights of immigrants, the legal 
question directly presented in those cases involved the boundary 
between state and federal power over immigration regulation. 
Although understanding that preemption doctrine frequently has 
proven successful as a litigation strategy, Professor Condon 
observes that it has not always ensured adequate protection of 
the rights of immigrants.40 
 “In recent years, both the United States Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence addressed to immigrants’ treatment by the states 
and an extensive scholarly literature, have focused heavily on 
immigration federalism.”41 A leading example is the Supreme 
                                                                                                     
and Proposition 187, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 201, 205–14 (1994). 
 37. See infra Part IV.B. (considering the appropriate scope of constitutional 
review of the immigration laws).   
 38.  See Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Donald Trump’s False Comments Connecting 
Mexican Immigrants and Crime, WASH. POST (July 8, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/07/08/donald-
trumps-false-comments-connecting-mexican-immigrants-and-crime/ (last visited 
July 2, 2016) (analyzing critically Donald Trump’s derogatory comments about 
Mexican immigrants and characterizing them as criminals) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Full Text: Donald Trump Announces a 
Presidential Bid, WASH. POST (June 16, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/06/16/full-text-
donald-trump-announces-a-presidential-bid/ (last visited July 2, 2016) 
(reprinting speech in which Trump announced that he would run for President) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 39.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, para. 2. 
 40.  See Condon, supra note 1, at 125–28. 
 41.  Id. at 80 (footnote omitted). 
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Court’s 2012 decision in Arizona v. United States,42 which 
invalidated on federal preemption grounds core provisions of 
Arizona’s S.B. 1070, a state immigration enforcement law that 
many commentators feared would increase discrimination 
against Latina/os by state and local law enforcement officers. 
Dutifully following the lead of Arizona v. United States, the 
lower courts regularly employ federal preemption doctrine to 
invalidate central provisions of state immigration enforcement 
laws.43 In large part, that focus results from the fact that litigants 
have frequently relied on preemption as a litigation strategy. 
Preemption challenges avoid the doctrinal impediments to Equal 
Protection claims, including the uncertainty of the standard of 
constitutional review given that the Supreme Court has not 
consistently applied strict scrutiny review to alienage 
discrimination as called for by Graham v. Richardson.44 In 
addition, the discriminatory intent required to establish a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause serves as a formidable 
barrier to constitutional challenges to state immigration 
enforcement laws.45  
Professor Condon expresses skepticism about the focus on 
federal preemption, rather than the constitutional rights of 
                                                                                                     
 42.  132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012); see Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 
582, 600 (2011) (holding that an Arizona law allowing for the revocation of the 
licenses of business that employ undocumented immigrants was not preempted 
by federal immigration law). 
 43.  See, e.g., United States v. South Carolina, 720 F.3d 518 (4th Cir. 2013); 
United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012); Ga. Latino Alliance 
for Human Rights v. Georgia, 691 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 44. See Condon, supra note 1, at 91–98 (analyzing the exceptions created 
by the Supreme Court to Graham v. Richardson’s strict scrutiny review of state 
alienage classifications).  
 45.  See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240–42 (1976) (holding that, to 
prevail on an Equal Protection claim, a plaintiff must establish a 
“discriminatory intent” by a state actor); see, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 
517 U.S. 456, 470 (1996) (finding that, despite overwhelming statistical evidence 
of racially disparate impacts on African-Americans of crack cocaine 
prosecutions, plaintiffs had failed to establish an Equal Protection claim); 
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298–99 (1987) (same in death penalty case). 
The barriers to Equal Protection challenges make litigation likely to put an end 
to only the most egregious patterns and practices of discrimination. See, e.g., 
Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254, 1257 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming in large part 
an injunction designed to end a pattern and practice of discrimination against 
Latina/os by a local law enforcement agency). 
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immigrants, in contemporary challenges to state immigration 
enforcement laws.46 In her view, this approach “elevat[es] 
deference to the federal government’s power to set immigration 
policy over a previously established constitutional commitment 
[in cases like Graham v. Richardson] to immigrants’ equal 
treatment by the states.”47 The fundamental concern shared by, 
among others, Harold Koh,48 is that the undue focus on 
federalism sacrifices the Equal Protection rights of noncitizens.   
Professor Condon specifically questions the propriety of weak 
Equal Protection rights for immigrants with respect to the federal 
government but strong rights with respect to the states.49 
Although anti-immigrant sentiment arguably is voiced more 
forcefully at the state and local levels than on the national scene, 
it unquestionably exists at the federal level. Indeed, the disfavor 
of certain groups of lawful immigrants in the national political 
process can be seen in many contemporary acts of Congress. 
Congress, for example, in 1996 welfare reform legislation 
authorized the states to deny benefits to lawful immigrants.50  
Similarly, 1996 immigration reform legislation and other laws 
have greatly expanded the removal grounds for lawful permanent 
residents convicted of crimes.51 As one influential commentator 
                                                                                                     
 46.    See Condon, supra note 1, at 125–28. 
 47.  Id. at 77 (footnote omitted). 
 48.  See Harold Hongju Koh, Equality with a Human Face: Justice 
Blackmun and the Equal Protection of Aliens, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 51, 98–99 
(1985) (stating that federal preemption doctrine “effectively subordinates 
fourteenth amendment equal protection doctrine governing discrimination 
against resident aliens to the vagaries of federal immigration policy.”). 
 49.  See Condon, supra note 1, at 98–102. 
 50.  See id. at 121–23; Gregory T. Rosenberg, Alienating Aliens: Equal 
Protection Violations in the Structures of State Public-Benefit Schemes, 16 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 1417, 1425 (2014) (“[The Personal Responsibility and Works 
Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996)]’s most significant 
change with respect to aliens and public benefits was the delegation to the 
states of the authority to restrict or expand alien [benefit] eligibility.”). 
 51.  See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009.  The Executive Branch has 
aggressively enforced the criminal removal provisions of the immigration laws, 
only to have the Supreme Court reject a number of removal orders. See, e.g., 
Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1983 (2015) (setting aside a removal order 
based on a drug paraphernalia conviction); Moncrieffe v. Holder 133 S. Ct. 1678, 
1693-94 (2013) (same for conviction of possession of a small amount of 
marijuana).  
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succinctly observed, the 1996 reforms, which greatly restricted 
judicial review of removal and other orders, constituted “the most 
radical reform of immigration law in decades—or perhaps ever.”52  
Professor Condon notes that “the assumption that the federal 
government is more protective of immigrant rights than the 
states over-simplifies the complex nature of federal immigration 
regulation and, in many instances, is simply inaccurate.”53 As is 
the case for state laws, federal law can be rather unforgiving 
toward immigrants, even ones lawfully in the United States.  
That development can be explained by the fact that, in both 
instances, immigrants are discrete and insular minorities and are 
legally prevented from full participation in the political process. 
Professor Condon observes that 
[a]lthough [the] interplay between federalism and equality has 
long existed in the equal protection jurisprudence involving 
immigrants, in the recent cases . . . federal immigration policy 
has played a more disruptive role, transforming equal 
protection doctrine involving state alienage classification into 
a preemption-like inquiry that privileges Congressional policy 
choices.54   
In instances in which Congress has permitted discrimination by 
the states against immigrants, the end result has been to shift 
the review standard from rigorous strict scrutiny review of 
Graham v. Richardson to the highly deferential approach of 
Mathews v. Diaz. As Professor Condon puts it, “[t]he rights-
enhancing theory of federalism treats congressional policy as a 
gatekeeper to Fourteenth Amendment rights, allowing Congress 
to decide who has claims to such rights.”55 
To illustrate her point that Congress has delegated power to 
the states to discriminate, Professor Condon analyzes the court of 
appeals decision in Soskin v. Reinertson,56 and other cases 
challenging congressional authorization of state denial of public 
benefits to lawful immigrants.57 She understands the delegation 
                                                                                                     
 52.  PETER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS 143 (1998).   
 53.  Condon, supra note 1, at 120 (footnote omitted). 
 54.  Id. at 84 (footnote omitted). 
 55.  Id. at 118 (footnote omitted).  
 56.  353 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2004) (rejecting a challenge to a Colorado law 
that denied healthcare benefits to lawful permanent residents).  
 57.  See Condon, supra note 1, at 103–04 (discussing, inter alia, Korab v. 
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as diluting the constitutional protections for immigrants; in 
effect, Congress has encouraged the states to deny benefits to 
immigrants lawfully admitted into the United States, a result 
that Graham v. Richardson condemned. As Professor Condon 
states, “[t]he supplanting of Fourteenth Amendment 
antidiscrimination norms with a doctrine disproportionately 
focused on congressional policy undermines Graham’s promise of 
equal treatment by the states. Or, more simply, it signals a 
preempting of equal protection for immigrants.”58   
Similarly, with the support and encouragement of Congress, 
the Executive Branch has enlisted state and local governments in 
the enforcement of the U.S. immigration laws, particularly with 
respect to immigrants who encounter the criminal justice 
system.59 State and local governments have increasingly resisted 
full cooperation with the immigration enforcement fervor of the 
U.S. government.60  
Professor Condon correctly contends that federal preemption 
of state law provides limited, indirect, and incomplete protections 
of the rights of immigrants. For example, in Arizona v. United 
States,61 the Supreme Court upheld Section 2(B) of Arizona’s S.B. 
1070, which requires local police to inquire about the immigration 
status of persons who they reasonably suspect are in the country 
in violation of the U.S. immigration laws.62 Section 2(B) 
                                                                                                     
Fink, 748 F.3d 875 (9th Cir. 2014)). Other commentators also have questioned 
the constitutionality of congressional efforts to allow the states to deny public 
benefits to immigrants. See, e.g., Carrasco, supra note 17, at 603–05; Mel 
Cousins, Equal Protection: Immigrants’ Access to Healthcare and Welfare 
Benefits, 12 HAST. RACE & POVERTY L.J. 21 (2015); David Wurzburg, Legalized 
Discrimination? Not in My State: State-Court Challenges to the Discriminatory 
Provisions of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act of 1996, 21 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 251 (2014). 
 58.  Condon, supra note 1, at 142 (emphasis added). 
 59. See Kevin R. Johnson, Doubling Down on Racial Discrimination:  The 
Racially Disparate Impacts of Crime-Based Removals, 66 CASE W.L. REV. 993, 
1010–25 (2016) (summarizing increased state and local involvement in federal 
immigration enforcement). 
 60. See, e.g., Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate? 
Local Sovereignty and the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373 
(2006); Rose Cuison Villazor, What Is a “Sanctuary”?, 61 SMU L. REV. 133 
(2008). 
 61.   132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
 62.  Id. at 2507–10. 
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contributed to fears of increased racial profiling of Latina/os by 
state and local law enforcement agencies.63 Although it 
invalidated other provisions of the Arizona law, the Court found 
that Section 2(B) was not preempted by federal law. Emphasizing 
the primacy of federal power over immigration, the U.S. 
government did not fashion the legal challenge to S.B. 1070 as 
one about the violation of the rights of noncitizens. Consequently, 
the litigants, and ultimately the Supreme Court, avoided any 
direct claim based on the rights of immigrants. The rights of 
immigrants ultimately were buried in a case that legally became 
one about federal versus state power over immigration.64  
IV. The Questions Raised by Professor Condon’s Line-Drawing 
Although Professor Condon’s article focuses on the rights of 
lawful immigrants, her analysis implicates important questions 
about the rights of undocumented and prospective immigrants. 
 
A. No Protection for the Most Vulnerable Immigrants 
Professor Condon’s article is limited to the Equal Protection 
rights of lawful immigrants, not the rights of undocumented 
immigrants.65 Although recognizing that the rights of all 
immigrants are related, she nonetheless states that the rights of 
the undocumented are “beyond the scope of the Article.”66  
                                                                                                     
 63. See, e.g., Kristina M. Campbell, (Un)Reasonable Suspicion: Racial 
Profiling in Immigration Enforcement After Arizona v. United States, 3 WAKE 
FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 367 (2013); Marjorie Cohn, Racial Profiling Legalized in 
Arizona, 1 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 168 (2012); David A. Selden, Julie A. Pace & 
Heidi Nunn-Gilman, Placing S.B. 1070 and Racial Profiling into Context, and 
What S.B. 1070 Reveals About the Legislative Process in Arizona, 43 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 523 (2011). 
 64. See Heeren, supra note 3, at 374 (contending that frequent judicial 
reliance on federalism and administrative law principles has deflected attention 
from the rights of immigrants). 
 65.  See Condon, supra note 1, at 82 n.15, 123 n.186. I have taken a similar 
approach in advocating for the extension of the right to counsel to lawful 
permanent residents, but not undocumented immigrants, in removal 
proceedings. See Kevin R. Johnson, An Immigration Gideon for Lawful 
Permanent Residents, 122 YALE L.J. 2394 (2013). 
 66.     Condon, supra note 1, at 123 n.186. 
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As Professor Condon acknowledges,67 the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Plyler v. Doe,68 recognized Equal Protection rights for 
undocumented children. In that landmark case, the Court held 
that the Fourteenth Amendment barred the states from 
excluding undocumented children from the Texas public schools. 
It, however, did so without finding that undocumented 
immigrants were a suspect class and thus that the Texas law was 
subject to strict scrutiny.69 Nonetheless, by protecting the rights 
of undocumented immigrants, Plyler v. Doe might serve as the 
touchstone for the possible expansion of the rights of 
undocumented immigrants.70 
Importantly, all immigrants, not only lawful ones, are 
disenfranchised discrete and insular minorities who cannot be 
expected to be adequately protected by the political process. The 
modern debate over immigration exemplifies how political 
majorities may demonize and punish undocumented immigrants, 
who are extremely unpopular among certain segments of 
American society.71  
Modern examples of antipathy directed toward 
undocumented immigrants are commonplace. Consider the 
passage in recent years of stringent immigration enforcement 
laws in circumstances strongly suggesting anti-Latina/o, anti-
immigrant animus, in Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, and South 
Carolina, among other states.72 Donald Trump’s vilification of 
Mexican immigrants, as well as the calls for expansion of the wall 
on the U.S./Mexico border and a mass deportation campaign 
                                                                                                     
 67.  See id. at 121–23. 
 68.  457 U.S. 202 (1982). See generally MICHAEL A. OLIVAS, NO 
UNDOCUMENTED CHILD LEFT BEHIND: PLYLER V. DOE AND THE EDUCATION OF 
UNDOCUMENTED SCHOOLCHILDREN (2012) (analyzing the factual and litigation 
history of Plyler v. Doe and the impacts of the Supreme Court decision). 
 69.  See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 219–20, (“[L]egislation directing the onus 
of a parent’s misconduct against his children does not comport with 
fundamental conceptions of justice.”). 
 70.  Commentators, however, have criticized the decision. See, e.g., Dennis 
J. Hutchinson, More Substantive Equal Protection? A Note on Plyler v. Doe, 
1982 S. CT. REV. 167, 184 (1982) (“Plyler cut a remarkably messy path through 
other areas of the Court’s jurisprudence.”). 
 71.  See, e.g., supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing Donald 
Trump’s derogatory comments about immigrants from Mexico). 
 72.  See supra note 43 (citing cases). 
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targeting Mexican immigrants modeled after the infamous 
“Operation Wetback,”73 helped build support for his presidential 
campaign.74 
In sum, Professor Condon leaves it to future scholars to 
analyze the Equal Protection rights of undocumented 
immigrants, whose vulnerable legal status has increasingly been 
recognized in public policy debates and executive actions.75 The 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, and its 
proposed expansion, are among the most well-known 
contemporary efforts to provide limited legal protections to 
undocumented immigrants.76  
 
 B. Prospective Immigrants and the Plenary Power Doctrine 
As discussed previously,77 Professor Condon’s approach to the 
constitutional review of laws discriminating against lawful 
immigrants implicates the modern vitality of the much-maligned, 
but still intact, plenary power doctrine. One could imagine Equal 
Protection doctrine that applies to all immigrants, just as it does 
to U.S. citizens, within the territory of the United States.  
Persons outside our borders and seeking entry into the country 
arguably are beyond the full scope of the Equal Protection 
                                                                                                     
 73. See Yanan Wang, “Humane” 1950s Model for Deportation, “Operation 
Wetback,” was Anything But, WASH. POST (Nov. 11, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/09/30/donald-
trumps-humane-1950s-model-for-deportation-operation-wetback-was-anything-
but/ (last visited July 2, 2016) (describing critically Donald Trump’s deportation 
plan) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). See generally JUAN 
RAMON GARCÍA, OPERATION WETBACK: THE MASS DEPORTATION OF MEXICAN 
UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS IN 1954 (1980) (documenting the history and impacts 
of “Operation Wetback”). 
 74.    See supra note 38 and accompanying text.  
 75. See Karen Nelson Moore, Aliens and the Constitution, 88 NYU L. REV. 
801, 810–23 (2013) (analyzing the varying Equal Protection rights for different 
groups of noncitizens). 
 76. See United States v. Texas, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 4057 (Supreme Court, 
June 23, 2016) (affirming by an equally divided Court the entry of a preliminary 
injunction barring the implementation of President Obama’s expanded deferred 
action programs); American Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer, 818 F.3d 901, 906 
(9th Cir. 2016) (describing the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) 
program). 
 77.    Supra notes 31–37 and accompanying text. 
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guarantee.78 One possibility is for more limited judicial review 
akin to rational basis review of classifications in the U.S. 
immigration laws, a standard that the Supreme Court at times 
has applied in reviewing the immigration laws.79 
Professor Condon carefully analyzes one aspect of the overall 
immigrants’ rights equation—the Equal Protection rights of 
lawful immigrants physically present in the United States. 
Future scholars hopefully will return to the question of the 
constitutional rights of noncitizens seeking admission into the 
United States as well as undocumented immigrants. 
V. Conclusion 
Recent years have seen federalism claims dominate 
immigration litigation implicating the rights of immigrants. 
Congress and the Executive Branch also have delegated 
immigration authority—and the power to discriminate against 
immigrants—to the states. In The Preempting of Equal Protection 
for Immigrants?, Professor Jenny-Brooke Condon questions the 
focus on federalism concerns as opposed to the constitutional 
rights of immigrants. She powerfully contends that federalism 
analysis should not displace the constitutional rights of 
immigrants. Professor Condon’s call for a return to Equal 
Protection fundamentals—and a focus on protecting the rights of 
noncitizens lawfully in the United States—is refreshing, timely, 
and powerful. 
In the future, the courts must reconsider their role in 
protecting vulnerable undocumented and lawful immigrants in 
our communities as well as noncitizens seeking admission into 
                                                                                                     
 78.  Cf. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 275 (1990) 
(holding that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to searches and seizures of 
noncitizens by U.S. law enforcement officers outside the United States). 
 79.  See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (acknowledging “the 
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1833, 1839 n.31 (1993) (noting that the test articulated by the Supreme Court in 
Kleindienst v. Mandel “appears roughly equivalent to the rational basis test”). 
 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 269 (2016) 288
the United States. Scholars must consider whether the lines 
drawn by the courts between noncitizens with rights and those 
without, are defensible as a matter of constitutional law. By re-
focusing attention on noncitizen rights Professor Condon has 
moved us forward in that all-important task.  
 
